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Adding Epicyctes: The Inconsistent Use
Test in Adverse Possession Law
MICHAEL H. LUBETSKY*
The common Law courts in Ontario developed the Inconsistent Use Test [IUT) to assess claims
of adverse possession. The IUT, however, often produces counter-intuitive results, which
has ted other jurisdictions to reject it and caused the Ontario courts to craft numerous ex-
ceptions and qualifications to the test that have left the state of the law on adverse posses-
sion very unclear. This article argues that the IUT actually represents an unconscious attempt
by the Ontario judiciary to develop a functional equivalent to the civil taw principle of "in-
terversion," currently found in article 923 of the Civil Code of Quebec (CCO). It further ex-
plores how the rise and falt of the IUT in a single generation reveals some of the weak-
nesses of inductive aw-making under the common taw tradition.
Les tribunaux de common lawde ['Ontario ont 61abor6 le Inconsistent Use Test OUT) en vue
d'6valuer tes revendications de possession adversative. Mais tIUT produit souvent des r6-
suttats contre-intuitifs, ce qui a men6 Les autres juridictions 6 le rejeter, et a pouss6 les
tribunaux de ['Ontario 6taborer de nombreuses exceptions et qualifications au test. CeLtes-ci
ont aiss6 tI6tat de droit tr~s obscur en mati~re de possession adversative. Cet article argue
que LIUT repr6sente en fait un essai inconscient du pouvoir judicaire de L'Ontario de d6ve-
topper un 6quivalent fonctionnel du principe, inscrit dans Le droit civil, de o L'interversion >,
figurant actuellement 6 ['articte 923 du Code civil du Qu6bec (CCQ]. It examine plus en pro-
fondeur comment lav~nement et a chute de L'IUT, en lespace d'une seute g6n6ration, met
nu certaines des faibtesses de [a corifection inductive des lois dans cadre de La tradition
de common law
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IN THE COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEM, judges "make law" to resolve cases that
appear before them. Faced with a live dispute, judges review the case law for a
similar factual situation that they then "apply" or "distinguish" from the case
before them. This article aims to illustrate the workings of this methodology by
considering, in detail, a particular line of Ontario jurisprudence that has sparked
controversy across the country.
In a series of three decisions beginning in 1977, the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal added the "inconsistent use test" (IUT) to Canada's law of adverse posses-
sion.1 Later judges, however, discovered that the IUT produces counterintuitive
and even outrageous results when applied in certain situations.2 In response,
1. See Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), [1977] 13 O.R. (2d) 680 (C.A.) [Keefer]; Fletcher v. Storoschuk
(1981), [1982] 35 O.R. (2d) 722 (C.A.) [Fletcher]; Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham (1984),
45 O.R. (2d) 563 (C.A.).
2. For criticisms of the IUT, see Brian Bucknall, "Two Roads Diverged: Recent Decisions on
Possessory Title" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 375; P.F. Smith, "A Check on Leigh v. Jack?"
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judges grafted a growing number of exceptions and qualifications onto the IUT,
which have made the law in this area increasingly unclear.
The controversy surrounding the IUT begs the question of whether a dif-
ferent analytical approach would have proven more useful. A careful look at all of
the IUT jurisprudence reveals that the relatively innocuous civil law principle of
"interversion," currently codified under article 923 of the Civil Code of Quebec'
(CCQ), elegantly explains the outcome of virtually all the cases that have con-
sidered the IUT. The common law lacks a concept analogous to interversion,
and it seems that the IUT, as amended and qualified over the years, represents
an attempt to create some functional equivalent.
Further, the adoption of the IUT and its subsequent evolution over the past
thirty years exemplifies one of the key disadvantages of common law methodol-
ogy: when an established legal principle fails in a subsequent case to produce a
result that the judge considers just, the judge will qualify it rather than identify
a completely different principle that adequately justifies the results in both the
past and present cases. This process of ongoing refinement makes common law
rules i ncreasingly-and unnecessarily-cumbersome and confusing.
In support of this argument, this article briefly reviews the law of both ac-
quisitive prescription and adverse possession (Part I), and then the doctrine of in-
terversion along with its closest common law equivalent (Part II). It then outlines
the development of the IUT and summarizes the various currents of jurispru-
dence it has engendered (Part III). An empirical analysis follows, which applies
the interversion principle to the entire corpus of Canadian IUT cases, and shows
how it produces much clearer and more consistent results (Part IV). Finally, the
article outlines a theory of "effective" inductive reasoning and illustrates how
common law law-making deviates from it (Part V).
I. ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
Western property law has long included mechanisms that allow for the acquisi-
tion of title to land through possession and use. Roman property law featured
usucapio and prxscriptio, which merged to become "acquisitive prescription" in
(1978) 41 Mod. L. Rev. 204; Martin Dockray, "Adverse Possession and Intent- 11" (1982)
The Conveyancer 345; Jeffrey W. Lem, Annotation of Murray Township Farms Ltd. v.
Quinte West (City) (2006), 50 R.P.R. (4th) 266 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Murray Township Farms].
3. Art. 923 C.C.Q.
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the modern civil law.4 The common law, in addition to adopting a form of pre-
scription from the civil law,5 developed the comparable institution of "adverse
possession." Analogous (if somewhat more limited) institutions appear in other
legal traditions, such as chazaka in Talmudic law6 and moulkya in Islamic law.7
Acquisitive prescription and adverse possession (collectively, "AP") aim
primarily to promote the stability and certainty of landholdings. The French legal
scholars Terr6 and Simler describe the institution as "one of the masterpieces of
our system of justice," since without it every landowner faces the spectre of dis-
possession stemming from the discovery of some long-forgotten defect in the
title associated with their property.8 AP serves the additional purpose, which has
arguably received greater attention in American legal discourse, of promoting
more efficient use of scarce resources by motivating owners to control the use of
their property and to periodically make their status as owners known.9
To claim title to a particular piece of property, AP claimants must prove
that they have conducted and represented themselves to the world as the prop-
erty's owner for a required period of time."0 AP claims tend to be extremely fact-
dependant, and different jurisdictions have developed different ways to organize
and assess the relevant factors. The civil law generally works with a two-part
4. Usucaption was originally a legal action, while prescription was a discretionary pretorian remedy.
See G6rald Cornu, Droit civil, 10th ed., t. 1 (Paris: Montchrestien, 2001) at 623, n. 1.
5. Common law prescription today applies generally to the creation of easements, rights-of-
way, and profits-t-prendre. See Sandra Petersson, "Something for Nothing: The Law of
Adverse Possession in Alberta" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1291 at 1293.
6. See generally Solomon Zeitlin, "Studies in Talmudic Jurisprudence: I. Possession, Pignus
and Hypothec" (1969) 60 Jewish Q. Rev. (New Series) 89 at 95-100.
7. Daniel Saurin, La Proprihti dans le droit musulman particuli5rement au Maroc (Paris: Comit6
du Maroc, 1906) at 17-18, 40.
8. Franqois Terr6 & Philippe Simler, Droit civil: Les biens, 7th ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 2006) at para.
456. For common law perspectives, see Raso v. Lonergan (1998), 114 O.A.C. 335 at para. 5
[Raso]; Petersson, supra note 5 at 1318. Similarly, the preamble to England's statute of
limitations of 1540 explains that it had become "a great occasion of much trouble, vexation
and suits to the King's loving subjects" that they could lose their landholdings after they
"have been in peaceable possession of a long season." The Act of Limitation (U.K.), 32 Hen.
VIII, c. 2, preamble [The Act of Limitation].
9. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles andPolicies (New York:
Foundation Press, 2007) at 201. See also Petersson, ibid. at 1319.
10. A variety of special rules aim to prevent the unjust dispossession of vulnerable landowners
such as minors. See e.g. Art. 2906 C.C.Q.
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framework of factual possession and animus domini (see Part I(A), below), while
common law courts generally opt for a two, three, or five-part paradigm (see
Part I(B), below). However, given that the underlying concept of AP does not
differ significantly from one jurisdiction to another, the panoply of analytical
approaches typically produce similar results.
A. ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
The civil law boasts a comprehensive framework that aspires to exhaustively char-
acterize the rights that individuals may have in relation to objects of property.
The regime centres on "ownership," defined in Quebec civil law as "the right
to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and' freely, subject to the limits and
conditions for doing so determined by law."" The CCQ prescribes six mecha-
nisms for the acquisition for ownership, and, when faced with a legal dispute
over property rights, identifying the owner(s) constitutes the starting point of
any analysis.
Alongside ownership, the civil law also recognizes "possession,"' 2 defined as
"the exercise in fact ... of a real right, with the intention of acting as the holder
of that right." 3 The use of the words "in fact," as opposed to "in law," recog-
nizes that the law, as articulated, does not always correspond to the realities of
those who live under it.'" In some cases, a person other than the legal owner
exercises the rights and derives the benefits inherent to ownership. The posses-
sion regime provides a vehicle for such de facto owners to protect themselves
from thieves and other wrongdoers, and to formalize their legally precarious
status." To be a possessor, a person must demonstrate two elements: (a) factual
11. Art. 947 C.C.Q.
12. Art. 911C.C.Q.
13. Art. 921 C.C.Q. [emphasis added].
14. Pierre-Claude Lafond, Pricis de droit des biens (Montreal: Th~mis, 2000), s. 2.2.1.1.2; Jean
Carbonnier, Droit civil. Les biens, 16th ed., t. 3 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1995) at 217-19.
15. It bears note that possession applies to real rights other than ownership (known as
"dismemberments" in the civil law). For example, if a plot of land falls under a usufruct (the
civilian equivalent of a lease), and a person other than the legal usufructuary exercises the
usufruct rights, he or she could become the "possessor of the usufruct." These cases, however,
are rather unusual (though see Rheaultc. Eouquette (1985), 37 R.P.R. 298 (Qc. C.A.)). See
also Cornu, supra note 4 at 623; Terr6 & Simler, supra note 8 at para. 459; Lafond, supra
note 14, ss. 2.2.1.1.1, 2.2.1.1.3; and Denys-Claude Lamontagne, Biens etpropriiti, 5' 6d.
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control over the property in question, and (b) animus domini-an intention to
actually be the owner of the property in question.16 Without animus domini, a
person exercising physical control is a mere "detainer.
The civil law distinguishes "good faith" from "bad faith" possessors, defining
the "good faith" possessor as one "justified in believing he holds the real right
he is exercising."" Good faith possessors include those whose adverse possession
claims are based on mistaken belief of ownership,19 and those whose rights be-
come retroactively voided. In contrast, bad faith possessors include those who
make possessory claims knowing that they are not the lawful owners and those
who have been proven negligent in formulating their claims to title. It bears
emphasis, however, that bad faith possession does not necessarily imply blame-
worthy conduct; the jurisprudence, has held, for example, that the category of
bad faith possessor also includes a finder of lost goods who aspires to acquire
ownership should the police fail to locate the true owner.2"
Under civil law, a possessor, whether in good or bad faith, enjoys a number
of rights, including a primafacie presumption of ownership (i.e., the actual owner
has the burden of proof in any legal action over title), the right to undertake
conservatory acts (i.e., the possessor can forbid other non-owners from making
use of the goods in question), the right to reimbursement of certain expenses
rmthe r e ow....er, and, in some cases, -th Is. ,,o and ... . "
Furthermore, after a prescribed period of time, the possessor can become the
owner of the object in question through acquisitive prescription.22 For immov-
(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2005) at para. 713. In the interest of simplicity, this article
will deal with possession as it relates to ownership rather than to its dismemberments.
16. Arts. 921-23 C.C.Q. See Lafond, supra note 14, s. 2.2.1.1.4.; Lamontagne, ibid. at paras.
656-69.
17. Arts. 921-23 C.C.Q.
18. Art. 932 C.C.Q.
19. This could include someone who purchased land from a person other than the rightful
owner. See Art. 1714 C.C.Q.
20. Malette c. Quibec (Sfirete), [1994] R.J.Q. 2963 at 2965 (C.S.).
21. See generally Lafond, supra note 14, s. 2.2.1.3.2. See also Lamontagne, supra note 15 at para.
649.
22. Art. 930 C.C.Q. Note that, under the Civil Code ofLower Canada (CCLC), acquisitive
prescription of immovable property occurred automatically after the requisite passage of
time. Under the CCQ, however, acquisition of immovable property occurs only after judicial
homologation. See Quebec, Ministre de la justice, Commentaires du ministre de lajustice
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able property, Quebec now has a single prescription period of ten years.23 France
has a prescription period of thirty years that can shorten to ten or twenty years,
depending on the proximity of the true owner, the good faith of the possessor,
and whether the possessor holds some kind of "juste titre" to the land (such as a
deed issued from the wrong person).24
B. ADVERSE POSSESSION
The common law organizes its property law very differently from the civil law.
Real property and chattels traditionally fall under separate legal regimes and
forms of action. English land law starts from the premise that the Queen "owns"
all real property and that all other rights in land, today known as "estates,"
derive from grants." In disputes over land use, the medieval courts distinguished
"proprietary actions," which determined lawful title to land, from "possessory
actions," which recognized rights of possession.26 For a variety of procedural
and jurisdictional reasons (not the least of which being that proprietary actions
could involve trial by battle), the possessory actions proved more popular, and
the proprietary actions fell into disuse.2" As a result of this history, when faced
with a legal dispute over land today, common law courts seek (in principle) to
determine who has the best right of possession rather than who is the rightful
"owner."28 Even so, the common law does recognize a number of estates, particu-
larly the fee simple absolute, that confer rights and privileges virtually identical
to ownership under civil law." Consequently, common law jurists do regularly
speak of "ownership" of land, even though the term has no legal significance.
(Quebec: Publications du Quebec, 1993), s. 2918 [Commentaires du ministref; Lafond, ibid.,
s. 2.2.5.1.
23. Art. 2918 C.C.Q.; Lamontagne, supra note 15 at para. 712.
24. Cornu, supra note 4 at 632-34; Terr6 & Simler, supra note 8 at paras. 462-70.
25. See E.H. Burn & J. Cartwright, eds., Cheshire and Burn s Modern Law of Real Property, 17th
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 27-28.
26. Ibid. at 27-29.
27. Ibid. at 28-29. See also F.W. Maitland, The Forms ofAction at Common Law: A Course of
Lectures (Cambridge: The University Press, 1936) at 21-23.
28. See Burn & Cartwright, supra note 25 at 28.
29. In jurisdictions that prohibit the fee simple absolute, another kind of estate will serve as the
equivalent to ownership, such as renewable Crown leases in the Australia Capital Territory.
See AustI., Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management)
Amendment Bill 1997, Bills Digest No. 135 (1997), online: <http://www.aph.gov.au/
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Similar to civil law, the common law operates on the assumption that the
person currently in seisin (possession) has the best right to continued possession,
and whoever claims the contrary bears the burden of proof. Early common law
courts, however, established that a person seised of land could lose possession if
a claimant could prove prior seisin.3t This "prior seisin" principle underlays a
number of "actions for recovery of land," such as novel disseisin, mort d'incestor,
entry, and ejectment.31 However, while the prior seisin principle protected those
dispossessed by usurpers, it created the spectre of longstanding and good-faith
possessors losing their lands when confronted with age-old seisin claims. Con-
sequently, the courts and legislature intervened at a very early date to set time
limits on actions for recovery of land.
King Henry II (r. 1154-1189) established England's first limitations legisla-
tion, which barred a putative claimant of land from invoking a prior seisin dating
from before his last voyage to Normandy. Effectively, this measure crystallized
the rights of possessors each time the King travelled overseas. Subsequent legis-
lation established fixed limitation dates, the most enduring of which, the 1275
Statute of Westminster,32 barred all claims of seisin dating from before the corona-
tion of King Richard I (3 September 1189)33 Parliament switched to a variable-
date regime when it enacted the Statute ofLimitations, 1540, which barred actions
for recovery if the plaintiff could not show seisin within the previous sixry years
(or a shorter period in some cases). 3" Additional legislation in 1623, known today
as the Statute ofJames,3" reformulated the rule to the effect that a plaintiff could
lose the right to recover land after twenty years (for possessory actions), or forty
years (for proprietary actions) following dispossession by another person.36
library/Pubs/bd/ 1 997-98/98bdl 35.htm>.
30. Burn & Cartwright, supra note 25 at 28. A discussion of the history and scope of the term
"seisin" goes beyond the scope of this article. See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. "seisin."
Mary Jane Mossman & William F. Flanagan, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 145-47.
31. Maitland etal., supra note 27 at 27-33; Burn & Cartwright, ibid. at 28-29.
32. Statute of Westminster, The First, 1275 (U.K.), 3 Edw. I., c. 5.
33. Note that for some specific forms of action, the limitation date would differ. Petersson, supra
note 5 at 1296-97, nn. 14-15; Henry W. Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession" (1918) 32
Harv. L. Rev. 135 at 137.
34. The Act ofLimitation, supra note 8; Ballantine, ibid. at 138.
35. Act for Limitation ofActions, for avoiding ofSuits in Law (U.K.), 21 Ja. I, c. 16 [Statute ofJames].
36. Ballantine, supra note 33 at 138.
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The different limitation periods for propriietary and possessory actions
created the peculiar situation whereby a plaintiff could invoke a thirty-year-old
prior seisin to defeat a landholder's right of possession, but not the latter's title.37
More troublingly, the passing of even the full forty-year limitation period did
not create or extinguish any legal title; it merely prevented a legal titleholder
from ejecting the possessor or demanding rents. If an adverse possessor aban-
doned the disputed land, the legal titleholder could retake possession without
further consequence. The persistence of title gave incentives for titleholders to
take "self-help" measures to harass possessors to leave so that they could reclaim
the land for themselves.38 The precarious nature of the possessor's rights even
after the limitation period had passed largely undermined the policy objectives
behind AP that sought to quiet titles and ensure greater security of ownership.
Consequently, it became necessary to supplement the adverse possession
regime with provisions that definitively extinguished a dispossessed titleholder's
rights upon passage of the limitation period. In the United States, these innova-
tions came largely from the judiciary;39 in England, they came in the Real Prop-
erty Limitation Act, 1833."° The English reforms were followed by essentially
identical legislation in the Canadian colonies." Since the extinguishment of the
titleholder's rights still did not invest legal title in the possessor, the legislature in-
tervened again with "quieting titles" legislation that permitted adverse possessors
to register their claims and become full legal titleholders in their own right. 2
Although the doctrine of adverse possession originated in legislation, the
courts have retained the responsibility of determining what conduct starts the
37. Ibid. at 139.
38. Alberta Law Reform institute, Limitations Act: Adverse Possession and Lasting Improvements
(Edmonton: Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2003) at paras. 14-15, 83-85, online: <http://
www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/fr89.pdf> [Alberta Law Reform Institute, Limitations Act Report].
39. Ballantine, supra note 33 at 139-40. See also Roger A. Cunningham, "Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz" (1986) 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 1 at 5, nn. 10- 11.
40. Act for the Limitation ofActions and Suits Relating to Real Property and For Simplifying the
Remedies for Trying the Rights Thereto (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27 [Real Property Limitation
Act, 1833]; Petersson, supra note 5 at 1296.
41. For a discussion of early Canadian jurisprudence, see H.D. Anger & J.D. Honsberger,
Canadian Law of Real Property (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1959) at 784-85. See also
Beaudoin v. Aubin (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 604 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 24 [Beaudoin]. On the
reception of the law in Alberta, see Petersson, ibid. at 1296.
42. Mossman & Flanagan, supra note 30 at 171.
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clock running against a legal tideholder, and a variety of frameworks have emerged
in the jurisprudence. The courts in Ontario have settled on a three-part test that
assesses (a) physical possession, (b) animus, and (c) dispossession of the legal
titleholder. The courts of England now adhere to a two-part framework, of
factual possession and animus, reminiscent of the civil law. Another widespread
approach, dominant in the United States, mandates a five-part inquiry, according
to which a claimant's possession must be actual, exclusive, open and notorious,
continuous, and adverse under a claim of right (the exact meaning of which varies
from one jurisdiction to another, but generally means that the possessor lacks
permission). 3 Some American states add further statutory requirements, such
as the payment of taxes over the requisite period." Canadian jurists typically add
that the physical possession must be "adverse" or "hostile" to the actual title-
holder," a requirement that echoes the civil law rule that the claimant's acts
must go beyond those performed with the permission or neighbourly acquies-
cence of the titleholder."
Whatever the framework, the common law has essentially the same physical
possession requirement as civil law. A claimant needs to demonstrate "exclusive,
continuous, open or visible and notorious" possession of the property in ques-
tion, and not simply possession that is "equivocal, occasional or for a special or
temporary purpose. '" 7 The exact acts required to ground possession can, how-
ever, vary according to the situation; "8 the acts required to possess a house differ
from those required to possess a shipwreck. 9 Because the common law has no
formal notion of land ownership, however, it has no notion of animus domini as
43. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9 at 198-99. R.H. Helmholz, "Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent" (1983) 61:2 Wash. U.L.Q. 331 at 334-35.
44. Indiana, for example, has such a statutory requirement. For a recent exposition on its history
and scope, see Fraley.v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
45. Sherren v. Pearson, [1887] 14 S.C.R. 581 at 585 [Sherren]. See also R. B. Ferguson
Construction Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (A.G.) (1989), 4 R.P.R. (2d) 89 at para. 6 (C.A.).
46. Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 2006) at 128.
See also Art. 924 C.C.Q.
47. Sherren, supra note 45 at 586.
48. Ziff, supra note 46 at 128.
49. The Tubantia, [1924] All E.R. Rep. 615 (Adm. U.K.). See also Burn & Cartwright, supra
note 25 at 123; Anger & Honsberger, supra note 41 at 787-92; and Mossman & Flanagan,
supra note 30 at 172.
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found in civil law."5 Instead, the common law requires animus possidendi-an
intention to possess and exclude all others.5" This "intention to exclude" require-
ment has long created difficulties-particularly when applied to what the civil
law would call "good faith" adverse possession-because of the following issue:
how can possessors have an intention to exclude the lawful tideholder when they
believe themselves to be the lawful titleholder? Faced with this conundrum, one
line of jurisprudence, seen in some jurisdictions in the United States (where it is
called the "Maine rule"), 2 has deduced that adverse possession cannot correct
mutual misunderstandings over land boundaries. Other jurisdictions take a dif-
ferent approach, holding variably that: (a) there is no need to prove the animus
possidendi when the possessor's claims are "unequivocal" (the preferred approach
in Ontario);53 (b) the animuspossidendi refers to an intent to exclude everyone,
not the true titleholder specifically (England and Alberta);" or even (c) the claim-
ant's state of mind is completely irrelevant to adverse possession-all that mat-
ters are the acts of possession (the "Connecticut rule" in the United States).
55
The third component of adverse possession in the Ontario framework-
actual exclusion of the titleholder-displays the origins of adverse possession
as a defence to actions to recover land. To a civil law jurist, the exclusion re-
quirement is redundant and covered by the principle that a claimant's factual
possession must be unequivocal.56 Under civil law, if a legal titleholder continues
to effectively exercise significant rights of ownership over disputed land, the
50. Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
at 138-39;].A. Pye (Oxford) Ltdv. Graham, [2003] 1 A.C. 419 (H.L.) at paras. 42-43 [Pye].
51. Clarke v. Babbitt, [1927] S.C.R. 148 at 163, Newcombe J., dissenting; Halsbury's Laws of
England, 4th ed. Reissue (London: Butterworths, 1997) vol. 28 at para. 977, n. 7; A.J.
Oakley, ed., Megarry's Manual of the Law of Real Property, 8th ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2002) at 552.
52. Note that the State of Maine abolished the principle by statute in 1993 and now allows for
adverse possession in cases of longstanding boundary errors. See Dombkowski v. Ferland 893
A.2d 599 at paras. 13-14 (Me. Sup. Ct. 2006) [Dombkowski]. The Maine rule persists, however,
in other states like Nebraska. See e.g. Pettis v. Lozier, 290 N.W2d 215 (Neb. Sup: Ct. 1980).
53. Beaudoin, supra note 41 at para. 40.
54. Pye, supra note 50 at para. 43; Lutz v. Kawa (1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 271 at para. 34 (Alta.
C.A.), rev'g (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 77 (Alta. D.C.J.).
55. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9 at 199. See also Helmholz, supra note 43 at 331-32;
Dombkowski, supra note 52 at para. 12. For a Canadian example, see e.g. Teis v. Ancaster
(Town) (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 216, 13 R.P.R. (3d) 55 at para. 16 (C.A.) [Teis].
56. Art. 922 C.C.Q.
508 (20091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
possessor's claim of unequivocal factual control becomes less credible. In Eng-
land, the House of Lords in 2003 came to much the same conclusion, explain-
ing that the exclusion of the titleholder is synonymous with the claimant being
in possession."-
Except in a few American states, 8 the common law makes no formal dis-
tinction between "good faith" or "bad faith" possession. Although generations
of common law judges have opined that the criteria for adverse possession must
be construed "in the very strictest manner" for an intentional trespasser,59 the
classical adverse possession regime does not mandate any inquiry into the pos-
sessor's justification for claiming possession.6" As explained in Part IV of this
article, however, the issue of good and bad faith bubbles under the surface in
many adverse possession cases.61
It bears note that the implementation of the Torrens system, devised in Aus-
tralia (under which registration in an official registry normally constitutes an
indefeasible and irrefutable proof of title), has essentially abolished adverse posses-
sion in some common-law jurisdictions and significantly reduced its scope in
others. As Ontario switches over to a Torrens system, adverse possession should
likewise become decreasingly relevant.62
57. Pye, supra note 50 at para. 38.
58. A few states, like Iowa and Washington, require good faith from adverse possession
claimants. See e.g. Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W. 2d 782 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1982); Merrill &
Smith, supra note 9 at 199, 207; and Helmholz, supra note 43 at 337, n. 22. In Hawaii, a
good faith requirement for adverse possession appears in the state constitution. See Hawaii
Const. art. XVI, § 12.
59. Harris v. Mudie (1882), 7 O.A.R. 414 at 421 (C.A.) [Harris], cited in Masidon, supra note 1
at para. 33. See also Campeau v. May (1911), 19 O.W.R. 751 at 752 (H.C.), cited in
Giouroukos v. Cadillac Fairview Corp. (1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 364 at para. 52 (H.C.), rev'd on
other grounds (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1986] 2 S.C.R. 707
[Giouroukos]. For a discussion in the American context, see Helmholz, ibid. at 332.
60. As Bruce Ziff has noted, there is an exception to this idea. If a claimant is claiming an entire
tract of land, but only physically using a piece of it, the adverse possession claim will include
the entire tract if the claim is based on a "colour of right," such as a defective land title. If the
claim is not based on a colour of right, then the claim will only cover the land that is
physically occupied. See Ziff, supra note 46 at 127.
61. See e.g. Woodv. LeBlanc, [1904] 34 S.C.R. 627 at par. 42 [LeBlanc]; Teis, supra note 55 at
para. 28; and Helmholz, supra note 43.
62. For a discussion and references to the continuing role of adverse possession under a Torrens
system, see Peterssen, supra note 5 at 1294-96; Jeremy S. Williams, "Title by Limitation
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I1.. INTERVERSION AND OUSTER
A. CIVIL LAW INTERVERSION
The two-part civil law test for acquisitive prescription-factual control with
animus domini-raises one particular dilemma: what happens when a detainer
changes intention vis--vis the property under detention? Since the animus con-
stitutes the only difference between possession and detention, a true owner has
no way to know that a tenant, lessee, or asset manager has formulated an animus
domini and started the clock running on, acquisitive prescription. To protect
owners in these situations, the civil law has developed the notion of "interver-
sion" (also known as "inversion of title")-a rule that requires a detainer to mani-
fest any change of intention with "unequivocal facts" and thereby give notice to
the true owner thiat their legal relationship has changed. Proof of interversion
may include legal measures, such as registering a claim at the land registry office,
or factual measures, such as refusing to pay rent. The determination of whether
a claimant's conduct suffices to constitute interversion is a question of fact within
the domain of the trial judge.
Article 923 of the CCQ articulates the inversion principle at a relatively
high level of abstraction, whilst article 2914 reiterates the rule more concretely
in the context of acquisitive prescription:
923. A person having begun to detain property on behalf of another or with ac-
knowledgement of a superior domain is presumed to continue to detain it in that
quality unless inversion of title is proved on the basis of unequivocal facts.
923. Celui qui a commence d~tenir pour le compte d'autrui ou avec reconnaissance
d'un domaine suprieur est toujours pr~sum6 d~tenir en la mime qualit6, saufs'il y a
preuve d'interversion de titre resultant de faits non 6quivoques.
2914. A precarious title may be interverted by a title proceeding from a third person
or by an act performed by the holder which is incompatible with precarious holding.
Interversion renders the possession available for prescription from the time the
owner learns of the new title or of the act of the holder.
in a Registered Conveyancing System" (1967) 6 Alta. L. Rev. 67; Ziff, supra note 46 at 125-
26; and Lutz, supra note 54 at paras. 15-19. See also Alberta Law Reform Institute,
Limitations Act Report, supra note 38. For a discussion of Ontario's transition to the Torrens
system, see Greg Taylor, The Law of the Land: The Advent of the Torrens System in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) c. 6. On the residual role of adverse possession
in those parts of Ontario that have converted to the Torrens system, see Cantera v. Eller
(2007), 56 R.P.R. (4th) 39 at para. 40 (Ont. Sup.Ct.). On England, see Pye, supra note 50.
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2914. Un titre pr6caire peut &tre interverti au moyen d'un titre 6manant d'un tiers ou
d'un acte du d&enteur inconciliable avec la pr~carit6. L'interversion rend la possession
utile la prescription, .compter du moment ob le propritaire a connaissance du nou-
veau titre ou de l'acte du d~tenteur.
Article 2914 of the CCQ and its French equivalent (article 2238 of the
Code civil (C. civ.)) present two forms of interversion: (a) "a title proceeding
from a third person," or (b) "an act performed by the holder which is
incompatible with precarious holding." The former refers to situations where a
possessor has received some kind of defective title, such as a deed of sale from
the wrong owner. The latter refers to unilateral acts by the possessor-"juridical,
judicial or material" 63-that deny the owner's rights and purport to usurp
them." The difference between the two categories of interversion has no legal
significance in Quebec, but in France it can affect the relevant prescription
period and the kind of owner-notification required.6"
Prescription between undivided co-owners ("tenants in common" in com-
mon-law terminology) also falls under the interversion rule." When a co-owner
exercises factual control over a particular piece of property, the co-owner simul-
taneously exercises control rights belonging to the other co-owners. If a co-owner
exercises the latter rights with the appropriate animus, he or she becomes a pos-
sessor of those rights and can acquire them through prescription. In practice,
however, such prescription can only occur in truly exceptional situations. A
co-owner has the right to use the entire property in question, and therefore acts
of use do not typically manifest the intention to extinguish the rights of the co-
owners. To obtain full ownership through acquisitive prescription the co-owner
must openly act in ways that contradict the rights of the other owners, which
effectively constitutes interversion as described in Art. 923 and 2914 CCQ. The
codal provisions on interversion, whether in Quebec or France, today receive
63. Lessardc. Me/drum, [2003] R.D.I. 323 (C.S. Qc.) at 327 [Lessard]. See also P.-B.
Mignault, Le droit civil canadien, t. 9 (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1916) at 395-96;
Witold Rodys, Traiti de droit civil du Quibec, t. 15 (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1958)
at 113.
64. Terr6 & Simler, supra note 8 at para. 170; Lafond, supra note 14, s. 2.2.2.2.
65. Denis Vincelette, En possession du Code civil u Quibec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004)
at para. 185, cited in Commentaires sur le Code civil Au Quebec (DCQ) (Cowansville, Qc:
Yvon Blais, 2007), s. 923 [Commentaires sur le CcQJ; Commentaires du ministre, supra note
22, s. 923. Note that the two categories were left out of the CCLC entirely.
66. See e.g. Lessard, supra note 63; see also Commentaires sur le CcQ, ibid., s. 923.
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scant treatment in the doctrine and jurisprudence, which suggests that they do
not prove particularly controversial.67
B. COMMON LAW OUSTER
Although the common law lacks a general category of "detainer" as found in
the civil law,68 it used to have a notion of "non-adverse possessor," meaning a
person presumed to possess land on behalf of the legal titleholder. For example,
if a person inherited land and a relative took possession, the relative was deemed
to possess the land on behalf of the heir. Because a non-adverse possessor occu-
pied the land on behalf of the titleholder, the titleholder was never dispossessed
and, thus, not subject to the Statute ofLimitations.
However, the courts also deduced that a non-adverse possessor could change
into an adverse possessor through ouster--a clear and overt demonstration that
he or she no longer recognized the rights of the person on whose behalf he or
she supposedly possessed the property.69 Ouster would thereby allow a relative
to adversely possess against an heir, or a co-tenant to adversely possess against
fellow co-tenants.
The Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, however, significantly modified the
judge-made law of ouster by abolishing the various presumptions underlying it.
Subsequent jurisprudence in Canada"0 and England"' interpreted the statute as
abolishing ouster altogether and mandating identical treatment for all possessors,
67. The only major doctrinal controversies over inversion were mostly settled a century ago and
they related primarily to cases where a detainer purports to acquire the property in question
from a person who is not the owner. French jurists have debated over whether such an act of
interversion is effective without the knowledge of the actual owner and/or whether it
required good faith. Quebec jurists debated over whether such an act of interversion was
contemplated at all by the wording of Art. 2205 C.C.L.C. See Mignault, supra note 63 at
393-95; Rodys, supra note 63 at 110-12.
68. Common law jurists sometimes use the terms "custodian" or "occupant" to contrast a
possessor from a non-possessing user of land, but the terms have no formal meaning. See
Ziff, supra note 46 at 119-20.
69. For an example of the differential treatment that is afforded to people subject to the ouster
rule, see Scott v. McLeod, 11856] 14 U.C.R. 574 (U.C. Q.B.).
70. Ibid. See also Lutz, supra note 54 at paras. 22-24; Plant v. Plant (1993), 48 R.F.L. (3d) 82
(Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.) at paras. 36-38; and Bentley v. PeppardEstate, [19031 33 S.C.R. 444
at para. 5.
71. Paradise Beach and Transportation Co., Ltd. v. Price-Robertson, [1968] 1 All E.R. 530 (H.L.);
Pye, supra note 50 at paras. 33-36.
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no matter how they originally came into possession of the property.7 2 This un-
derstanding effectively precluded the development of a doctrine resembling
interversion and, as later judges discovered, left behind a significant hole in
adverse possession law.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCONSISTENT USE TEST
The classical formulation of AP in both the civil and common law requires no
evaluation of the state of mind of the legal titleholder.73 The JUT modified this
principle by requiring an adverse possessor to prove that he or she frustrated the
titleholder's actual designs for the land in question. This necessitated, for the first
time, an inquiry into the titleholder's intentions.
A. ORIGINS OF THE IUT
The JUT originated in the 1879 case of Leigh v. Jack, which involved a strip of
land reserved for road development that a neighbour used as a foundry dump.7"
The court rejected the neighbour's adverse possession claim on the grounds that
dumping garbage did not disrupt the titleholder's project of holding the land.
for a future road. Lord Bramwell summarized the court's view that "in order to
defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done which are
inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he intended
to use it."'6
Leigh and its progeny did not appear in the leading Supreme Court of Can-
ada adverse possession cases;77 therefore, the test did not arrive in Canada until
1977, when the Ontario Court of Appeal's Justice Wilson (as she then was)
72. The abolition of "non-adverse possession" has arguably made the term "adverse possession"
obsolete, and it would, perhaps, be more accurate to speak of "possessory title" or "title based
on possession." Nevertheless, the term has persisted until this day.
73. Note, however, that a titleholder's state of mind may indirectly relate to the issue of whether
the claimant was acting with permission. See Art. 924 C.C.Q. See also supra notes 43, 46,
and accompanying text.
74. (1879), 5 Exch. Div. D. 264 (U.K. C.A.) [Leigh].
75. Burn & Cartwright, supra note 25 at 125.
76. Leigh, supra note 74 at 273 [emphasis added].
77. Particularly Sherren, supra note 45; Handley v. Archibald, [1899] 30 S.C.R. 130; and LeBlanc,
supra note 61. Leigh, ibid., was referenced in the rarely-cited case of Dominion Atlantic
Railway Co. v. Halifax and South Western Railway Co., [1947] S.C.R. 107 at 110.
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adopted it in Keefer v. Arillotta.78 Keefer involved a strip of land over which a
neighbour held a right-of-way."' The neighbour made increasingly intensive use
of the strip of land that exceeded the rights included in a right of way, including
installing a shed and building an ice rink.8" Eventually, the neighbour claimed
the strip of land by adverse possession. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected
the claim, holding that the claimant's acts did not frustrate the titleholder's in-
tentions for the land (which were necessarily quite limited, since the titleholder
could not build on the land without blocking the right-of-way).81
A surprising element of Keefer involved how Justice Wilson integrated the
IUT into established adverse possession theory. As discussed above, Ontario
courts apply a three-part framework in which an adverse possessor must dem-
onstrate (a) factual control, (b) animus possidendi, and (c) actual exclusion of the
titleholder.82 Intuitively, it would seem that the IUT should fall into the third
branch, insofar as frustrating a titleholder's intentions would seem to suggest
exclusion. However, for reasons not given, Justice Wilson considered the IUT a
question of animus possidendi, holding that the failure to frustrate the owner's
intentions evidenced a lack of intention to possess the land to the exclusion of
all others.83
Two subsequent Court of Appeal cases, Fleicher v. Stordschuk4 and Masidon
v. Ham Investments,8  reaffirmed the IUT and firmly established it as an essen-
tial element of Ontario adverse possession law. Fletcher involved a farmer who
had installed a fence within his own land to prevent his cattle from wandering
too close to the land boundary.86 His neighbours performed various acts of cul-
tivation on the strip of land between the fence and their mutual land boundary,
even though they knew they did not own it." The neighbours eventually made
a claim for the strip based on adverse possession, which the court rejected on
78. Supra note 1.
79. Ibid. at 683.
80. Ibid. at 684-85.
81. Ibid. at 690-93.
82. Ibid. at 692.
83. Ibid. at 691.
84. Fletcher, supra note 1.
85. Masidon, supra note 1.
86. Fletcher, supra note 1 at para. 2.
87. Ibid. at paras. 3-4.
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the basis that their acts did not interfere with the titleholder's intended use of
the strip, which was to keep cattle away from their mutual border.88
Masidon, the most storied example of the IUT, involved a large tract of land
held for speculation by a developer.8 9 The claimant, a former tenant of the land
under the previous owner, erected fences, built a dam, and even built and oper-
ated a two-runway private airport listed on various official publications.9" Even
so, he also lost his adverse possession claim, ostensibly because his acts of use-
intensive though they were-did not interfere with the titleholder's intention of
holding the land for speculation. 1
It bears note that Justice Blair in Masidon, unlike Justice Wilson in Keefer,
considered the IUT a matter of exclusion, not animus.92 The difference in ap-
proach left behind considerable confusion and gave rise to three separate schools
of jurisprudence: one treating the IUT strictly as a matter of intention,9 3 a sec-
ond treating it as an element of exclusion,9" and a third treating it as a matter
of both.95
After Masidon, the IUT made a brief appearance in New Brunswick during
the 1980s, although it disappeared as the province changed over to the Torrens
system. The test received a more enthusiastic welcome in Prince Edward Island,
where the Court of Appeal adopted it in Re Squires6 and Re MacKinnon.7 The
88. Ibid. at paras. 8-9.
89. Masidon, supra note 1 at paras. 10, 25.
90. Ibid. at paras. 4-7.
91. Ibid. at para. 25.
92. This comes out most clearly in ibid. at para. 36.
93. Gorman v. Gorman (1998), 110 O.A.C. 87 at paras. 9-17; Raso, supra note 8 at paras. 3-5;
Bruce v. Follis, [1990] O.J. No. 2546 at paras. 28-30 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); and Galati v.
Tassone, [1986] O.J. No. 698 at para. 11 (S.C. Ont. (H.C.J.)) (QL) [Galati].
94. Penwest Development Corp. Ltd. v. Youthdale Ltd. (2005), 46 R.P.R. (4th) 124 at para. 8
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Penwest]; McElwain v. White, [1996] O.J. No. 280 at para. 20 (Ct. J.
(Gen. Div.)) (QL) [White].
95. Georgco Diversified Inc. v. Lakeburn Land Capital Corp (1993), 31 R.P.R. (2d) 185 at paras.
13-17 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) [Georgco Diversified]; Bradford Investments (1963) Ltd. v.
Fama (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 127 at paras. 76-101 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Bradford Investments];
Laurier Homes (27) Ltd. v. Brett (2005), 42 R.P.R. (4th) 86 at para. 29 (Ont. Sup. Ct.)
[Laurier Homes]; Marotta v. Creative Investments Ltd. (2008), 69 R.P.R. (4th) 44 at para.
101ff (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Marotta]; and Rowe-Wilkinson v. Wright (2004), 27 R.P.R. (4th) 267
at paras. 16-22 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
96. Squires (Re) (1999), 182 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 318 (P.E.I. S.C. (A.D.)) [Squires].
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test was also recently accepted in Nova Scotia in Board of Trustees of Common
Lands v. Tanner.98
The JUT has not, however, found favour in all of Canada's common law
provinces. Alberta bluntly rejected it in Lehr v. St. Mary River Irrigation District,99
while Newfoundland, in Fitzpatrick's Body Shop Ltd. v. Kirby, held that the in-
tended use of the titleholder was simply one factor among many to consider."'0
While these developments were taking place in Canada, English courts were
decisively moving away from the JUT. Following Leigh, the JUT gradually
evolved into a theory that titleholders gave an "implied licence" to any intruder
using their lands in ways that did not frustrate their plans."' This "implied
licence" theory so eviscerated adverse possession-the English Law Reform
Committee described it as a "judicial repeal" of the Statute of Limitationsl 02 -
that Parliament intervened to abolish it by statute."0 3 Subsequently, in JA. Pye
(Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham, the House of Lords denounced Leigh and England's
entire line of IUT jurisprudence as "heresy." 'l The developments in England
did not pass unnoticed in Ontario, where the JUT began creating quandaries
for judges even before the ink in Masidon had time to dry.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE IUT IN ONTARIO
Following the implantation of the JUT in Ontario, courts soon found themselves
confronted with cases that tested the limits of the doctrine. The problematic cases
fell into the three broad categories of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, and
manifestly apathetic titleholders. In all of the three categories, judges were divided
on whether to create categorical exceptions to the JUT, or else impute some kind
of fictitious intention to the titleholder that the claimant's actions could frustrate.
97. MacKinnon (Re) (2003), 226 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 293 (S.C. (A.D.)) (MacKinnon].
98. Board of Trustees of Common Lands v. Tanner, 2005 NSSC 245 at paras. 60-75 [Tanner].
99. [19931 A.J. No 1411 at para. 86 (Q.B.) (QL).
100. (1992), 99 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 42 at para. 32 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)). The Newfoundland &
Labrador Court of Appeal confirmed this view of the JUT in Maher v. Bussey (2006), 256
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 308 at paras. 50-51.
101. Burn & Cartwright, supra note 25 at 126.
102. Mossman & Flanagan, supra note 30 at 196.
103. Ibid. at 197-99. See also Burn & Cartwright, supra note 25 at 126; Limitations Act 1980
(U.K.), 1980, c. 58, Schedule 1, s. 8(4).
104. Pye, supra note 50 at paras. 44-45.
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1. THE MUTUAL MISTAKE CASES
The first challenge to the IUT emerged with "mutual mistake" cases--disputes
involving neighbours mistaken as to their mutual boundary and adhering to a
de facto border different from the legal one. Under civil law, mutual mistake cases
pose no controversy and serve as the archetypical case of acquisitive prescription:
after the requisite limitation period, legal title to the strip of land between the
legal and defacto border passes to the neighbour believed to be the legal owner."'5
Common law courts, in contrast, have long disagreed over whether adverse
possession could correct boundary errors,10 6 as seen in the United States in the
debate between the Maine Rule and the Connecticut Rule."' Ontario only
took a position in 1981, when Beaudoin v. Aubin applied adverse possession
to a mutual mistake situation.18
Beaudoin was decided around the same time as the early Canadian JUT
cases, and although many subsequent cases simply followed the decision with-
out much reflection (including the Court of Appeal in Keil v. 762098 Ontario,
a ruling that led one commentator to suggest that the JUT had been repealed)," 9
the issue of how to reconcile Beaudoin with the JUT jurisprudence quickly arose.
Courts faced the challenge of explaining how an adverse possessor could frus-
trate a titleholder's intentions with respect to land that the latter did not even
know that he or she owned.
Palis v. Benedetti," ' Murdoch v. Kenehan,"' and Hoffele v. Bernier"2 dealt
with this quandary by imputing some form of intended use to the titleholder.
Palis and Murdoch took a hypothetical approach, applying the JUT based on what
105. Lamontagne, supra note 15 at para. 714.
106. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For an early discussion in the American context
that lists relevant jurisprudence, see generally Ralph W. Aigler, "Possession Under Mistake as
Adverse Possession" (1912) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 57. For a Canadian example, compare the
Divisional Court and Court of Appeal judgments in Lutz, supra note 54.
107. See supra notes 52, 55, and accompanying text.
108. Beaudoin, supra note 41. See also Martin v. Weld(1860), 19 U.C.Q.B. 631 at 632, cited in
Lutz, supra note 54 at paras. 22-23 (C.A.).
109. John Mascarin, Annotation of Keil v. 762098 Ontario Inc., [1992] 91 D.L.R. (4th) 752
(Ont. C.A.), aff'g [1989] O.J. No. 866 (H.C.J.) [Keil].
110. [1989] O.J. No. 128, 1989 CarswellOnt 2614 (Dist. Ct.) [Palis].
111. (2003), 8 R.P.R. (4th) 257 at para. 47 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Murdoch].
112. [1992] O.J. No. 1231 at para. 11 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL) [Hoffele].
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the titleholders would have wanted to do, had they known that they were the
actual titleholders of the lands in question.1 3 Hoffele, on the other hand, fea-
tured a potestative approach, imputing intent based on what the titleholder
could have done with the claimed strip of land, had he known about his title.
Instead of imputing intent, however, most courts simply exempted mutual
mistake cases from the IUT altogether, justifying the exemption in different ways.
Under one approach, seen in Walker v. Brickman,"' the animuspossidendi can be
"presumed" when the acts of possession are "unequivocal," and insofar as the
IUT forms part of the animus, the presumption dispenses with the IUT alto-
gether. "' Other cases adopting this general approach included Raso v. Lonergan'!
and Jefbrett Enterprises Ltd. v. Marsh Bros. Tractors Inc."7
A very different approach appears in Wood v. Gateway of Uxbridge Properties
Inc.." 8 Positing that the IUT sought "to prevent the unjust enrichment of wanton
trespassers,"" 9 Justice Moldaver held that the test only applied to claims involv-
ing what the civil law would consider bad faith possessors.12 Echoing the English
jurisprudence later judged "heretical," Justice Moldaver suggested that acts by a
trespasser could not frustrate the titleholder's intentions because they occurred
with implied permission, and thus could not support any adverse possession
claim. 1' Similar reasoning appears in Cunningham v. Zebarth Estate.'22
The issue of how to reconcile mutual mistake adverse possession with the
JUT finally arrived before the Court of Appeal in Teis v. Ancaster (Town),
123
113. Palis, for example, involved a titleholder using his plot of land as a landfill dump while his
neighbour used his for residential purposes. Justice Fleury deduced that the titleholder would
have wanted to use the disputed land for more dumping had he known about his title to it,
and that the claimant's use of the land as a residential backyard was clearly inconsistent with
industrial dumping. See Palis, supra note 110 at paras. 12, 18.
114. 1988 CarswellOnt 2860 (Dist. Ct.) [Walker].
115. Ibid. at paras. 37-39.
116. Raso, supra note 8 at para. 3.
117. (1996) 5 O.T.C. 161 (Gen. Div.) at para. 55 [Jefflbrett].
118. (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 769 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) [Wood].
119. Ibid. at para. 45.
120. Ibid. at para. 42.
121. Ibid. at para. 53.
122. (1998), 18 R.P.R. (3d) 299 at paras. 54-57 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) [Cunningham].
123. Teis, supra note 55.
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which unanimously held that the IUT simply does not apply in cases involving
mutual boundary errors. Justice Laskin's analysis synthesized both the Wood
and Walker lines of jurisprudence, explaining that: (a) mutual mistake adverse
possessors can benefit from a presumption of animus; and, (b) as a matter of
policy, the IUT aimed to increase the evidentiary burden upon intentional tres-
passers.2' It bears note, however, that Justice Laskin did not discuss, much less
endorse, the more radical "implied license" theory mooted in Wood.
2. THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE CASES
Teis divided adverse possession cases into two categories: the "advertent tres-
passer" group, which was subject to the IUT, and the "mutual mistake" group,
which was not. As foretold in academic commentary following the decision, 25
the decision left open a group of "unilateral honest mistake" scenarios in which
both the claimant and titleholder believe themselves the legal titleholder, and
where the actual titleholder does not object to the mistaken titleholder's acts of
possession. Such cases often involve disputes involving family members, friendly
neighbours, or absentee titleholders.
Unilateral mistake cases often involve boundary misunderstandings, and a
number of JUT cases, including Pinder v. Aregers,126 Brodie v. Flake,'27 and Di-
Genova v. Ilotchkiss128 have featured claimants who performed various grounds-
keeping acts on strips of their neighbour's land that they believed they owned.
The courts have generally rejected such claims, invoking the IUT to find that
their acts of possession did not defeat their neighbour's title. In Penwest Devel-
opment Corp. v. Youthdale Ltd, 21 the court even rejected such a claim when the
claimant built a minor structure on the disputed land.
A change in attitude appears, however, if the mistaken claimant encloses the
disputed land with a fence. The courts have generally allowed adverse possession
claims under such circumstances, although they disagree over whether to create
another JUT exception or impute some intent to the titleholder. The latter ap-
124. Ibid. at paras. 27-29.
125. Brian Bucknall, "Teis v. Ancaster. Knowledge, the Lack of Knowledge and the Running of a
Possessory Title Period" (1998) 13 R.P.R. (3d) 68.
126. 11986] O.J. No. 973 (Sup. Ct.) (QL), var'd (1988), 30 O.A.C. 137 (Div. Ct.) at para. 17.
127. (1999), 28 R.P.R. (3d) 87 at paras. 12-14 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Brodie].
128. (2001), 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 968 at paras. 10-13 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [DiGenoval.
129. Penwest, supra note 94 at para. 8.
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proach appears in Georgco Diversified v. Lakeburn Land Capital Corp,130 which
involved several residents who mistakenly encroached upon lands owned by a
developer because an old fence gave an incorrect impression about where the
true border lay. The title-holding developer knew about the encroachments,
but took no action for over thirty years. When considering the JUT, Justice
Ground held that it produced a "ludicrous" result to expect claimants to con-
tradict the intended use of a titleholder who did not care about the land under
dispute. Consequently, he imputed an obviously fictitious intent to the devel-
opers to the effect that "no one else make use" of the land in question.' Since
fencing the land frustrated this imputed intention, the claimants were found to
have excluded the titleholder and were thus successful in their claims.
Bradford Investments (1963) v. Fama also involved a homeowner who claimed
several strips of developer-owned land beyond his legal boundary.'32 The title-
holder had "lost interest" in the land, 3 3 while the homeowner, assuming him-
self responsible for the neglected land, fenced and cultivated it.134 The court even-
tually granted the homeowner's claim to the land, but rather than impute an
intention to the titleholder, Justice Cullity carved out a wordy exception to the
JUT: the test does not apply to a neighbour who encloses lands under a bona
fide belief of ownership where the titleholder raises no objection and has no
physical contact with lands. This exception for the "good faith enclosure unop-
posed by the absent neighbour" might be called the "GEUAN exception. '
Other cases, including Arnprior (Town) v. Coady36 and Tucker v. Moffatt,'37 have
130. Georgco Diversified, supra note 95.
131. Ibid. at paras. 16-17. The intent was obviously fictitious since the titleholders knowingly
tolerated the claimant's incursions for three decades.
132. Bradford Investments, supra note 95.
133. Ibid. at para. 16.
134. Ibid. at para. 30.
135. Ibid. at para. 97. See also Murray Township Farms, supra note 2 at paras. 18-21 (which
endorsed the GEUAN exception in upholding a farmer's claim against another absentee
titleholder). The decision in Murray Township Farms does not make clear on what basis the
claimant entered and enclosed the land in question. However, the judge did find the claimant
"not a knowing trespasser ... whose actions were not dishonest in any sense" (at para. 21).
This suggests that the claimant was acting on the basis of a mistake about land borders.
136. (2001), 42 R.P.R. (3d) 188 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), aff'd 2002 CarswellOnt 1292 (C.A.) at para. 48
[Arnpriorl. Justice Aiken had previously articulated this theory in Cunningham, supra note
122 at para. 54.
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taken similar approaches, essentially extending the GEUAN exception to all
cases of good faith adverse possession.
3. THE APATHETIC TITLEHOLDER CASES
As seen in the cases involving mutual or unilateral mistake, the IUT produces
counter-intuitive results with titleholders who genuinely do not care how their
land is used. Applied in its most extreme sense, the IUT makes it impossible
for an adverse possessor to claim title to land held for speculation or long-term
development. Some judges welcomed this result on the grounds that a developer
should not have to incur the cost of frivolous acts of possession just to prevent
the loss of their lands to squatters. 3 ' On the other hand, barring claims against
developers frustrated meritorious suits and thereby undermined the policy ob-
jectives underlying adverse possession. Consequently, some judges modified the
IUT to allow certain proceedings to succeed.
In addition to the mutual mistake and GEUAN exceptions, some judges
exempted claimants from the IUT when they could show a "colour of right"-
some kind of documentary basis (valid or otherwise) for claiming possession of
the whole plot of land.139 Murray Township Farms Ltd. v. Quinte West (City), for
example, involved a farming corporation that incorporated a plot of neighbour-
ing land held by an absentee titleholder into its operations. After decades of cul-
tivation, the corporation communicated an adverse possession claim to the title-
holder who, rather than dispute it, simply stopped paying taxes and attempted
to precipitate a tax sale.' When the corporation's claim came to the court over
ten years later, Justice Hackland rejected the titleholder's argument that her
"intended use" of the land was to maximize its tax sale proceeds, and held that
the farming corporation's written assertion of title gave its possession a "colour
of right" that exempted it from having to satisfy the IUT.
137. (2007), 64 R.P.R. (4th) 313 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds (2008) 73 R.P.R. (4th)
247 at para. 31 (Ont. C.A.) [Tucker].
138. Tasker v. Badgerow (2007), 60 R.P.R. (4th) 79 at paras. 124-26 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Tasker];
Masidon, supra note 1 at para. 30.
139. See supra note 60. It bears note that judges use the term "colour of right" to mean different
things in different circumstances. In 1amson v. Jones, for example, the judge essentially
assimilates "colour of title" with good faith. See Hamson v. Jones (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 304
(Sup. Ct.) at para. 37 [Hamson]. For a broader discussion in the American context, see
Cunningham, supra note 39 at 10-12.
140. Murray Township Farms, supra note 2 at paras. 9-10.
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Another recognized exception to the IUT involves titleholders whose apathy
reaches such an extreme level that it effectively constitutes defacto abandonment
of the land in question. Such a scenario occurred in Galati v. Tassone, where the
titleholder admitted that the disputed land was of more use to his neighbour
than to him. 1" In this case, Justice Anderson declined to apply the IUT, deem-
ing it "so preposterous that I decline to entertain the suggestion" to require a
claimant to frustrate the intention of a titleholder who clearly had none.1"2 The
defacto abandonment exception to the IUT also attracted discussion in Elias v.
Coker, ' Skoropad v. 726950 Ontario,"' and in the trial decision of Elliott v.
Woodstock Agricultural Society. "'5
Rather than create more exceptions to the IUT, other judges chose to im-
pute intentions to absentee or apathetic titleholders, and no less than six dif-
ferent imputation theories have appeared in the jurisprudence. A number of
early cases endorsed afuture use approach, applying the IUT based on the title-
holder's long-term plans for the land. Giouroukos v. Cadillac Fairview Corp.
involved a plot of land that a developer was holding for future development and
the claimant was using as a parking lot.'" The trial judge allowed the adverse
possession claim, deducing that using the land as a parking lot was inconsistent
with future plans to build upon it."4 7 The future use approach did not last very
long-the Ontario Court of Appeal expressly rejected it in Masidon, 1 8 and the
Supreme Court of Canada later reversed the decision in Giouroukos (although
on other grounds).
The Court of Appeal, however, did approve the potestative approach, which
imputes intent based on what tasks the titleholder could do with the disputed
land. For example, Tigwell v. Castle Village Shops Ltd."9 considered a claim for
land that was subject to a right-of-way and upon which the claimant had built
two large walls to prevent land slippage. The Court of Appeal deduced that,
141. Galati, supra note 93 at para. 4.
142. Ibid. at para. 11.
143. [1990] O.J. No. 982 at para. 88 (Dist. Ct.) (QL).
144. (1990), 12 R.P.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 37 [Skoropad].
145. 2008 ONCA 648 at para. 17, rev'g (2007), 60 R.P.R. (4th) 55 (S.C.J.) [Elliott].
146. Giouroukos, supra note 59 at paras. 1-4, 9.
147. Ibid. at paras. 24-28.
148. Masidon, supra note 1 at para. 29.
149. (1984), 6 O.A.C. 1.
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since the right-of-way prevented him from building anything on the land, the
titleholder could only use the land as a cross-over from one part of his property
to another. Since the walls made such a use impossible, the Court allowed the
adverse possession claim on the ground that the building of the walls frustrated
any possible use by the titleholder.' Similar deductions appear in Vaz v. Jong"
and Hoffele. "2
A variant of the potestative approach presumes that a titleholder would never
intend to use his or her land for unlawful purposes; consequently, any unlawful
use of the land by the claimant can serve as a basis for adverse possession.1
3
Hamson v. Jones5' dealt with a titleholder who sold a piece of his land to his
uncle, yet was prevented by the municipality from severing the plot. The uncle
nevertheless constructed a home and installed electricity on the land purchased.
Because local by-laws only allowed single dwellings, the uncle's home-building
resulted in charges against the titleholder. 55 When the uncle later made an
adverse possession claim for the land, Justice Parker concluded that, because his
activities violated municipal by-laws, they had to be inconsistent with whatever
use the titleholder could possibly have intended. 56
In adverse possession claims against legal persons, the teleological approach
imputes an intended use based on the legal person's constitutive act. Orangeville
Raceway (Ontariu), Inc. v. 450919 Ontario inc. 57 involved a claim to a plot of
land owned by a conservation authority. For various reasons, the authority could
not develop the land into a conservation area, and it became a local dumping
site. After the dump filled up, the claimant used the land as a parking lot.158 Even
though the authority consented to both uses of the land, Justice McGarry held
150. Ibid. at paras. 3-4..
151. (2000), 32 R.P.R. (3d) 271 at para. 102 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
152. Hoffele, supra note 112 at para. 11.
153. The policy implications of this principle are particularly interesting, since it suggests that the
adverse possessor is rewarded for unlawful conduct. On the other hand, it is hard to hold
blameless a titleholder who tolerates the use of his or her land for unlawful purposes.
154. Hamson v. Jones (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 304 (Sup. Ct.) [Hamson].
155. Ibid. at paras. 2-24.
156. Ibid. at para. 52.
157. (1987), CarswellOnt 3333 (Dist. Ct.) (WLeC), rev'd pursuant to settlement, [19901 O.J.
No. 1476 (C.A.) (QL).
158. Ibid. at paras. 4-12.
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that such activities were fundamentally inconsistent with using the land for
conservation purposes and, therefore, sufficient to support an adverse posses-
sion claim."5 9
The objective approach to the IUT does not consider the titleholder's sub-
jective intentions, but rather the probable uses of an ordinary person holding
title to the land in question. If the claimant's acts of possession would frustrate
the intentions of an ordinary person holding title to the land-if not necessarily
the actual titleholder-they can support an adverse possession claim. Echoes of
this form of analysis appear in the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal deci-
sion in MacKinnon (Re),6 ' which concerned a claim to a rural plot of land which
neither the titleholder nor claimant used extensively. The Nova Scotia case of
Duggan v. Nova Scotia (A. G.) understood the IUT in this way as well. 6 '
Finally, the evacuative approach applies the IUT based on a presumption
that the titleholder intends that "no one else use the land"-that it be kept
"vacant"-a presumption that makes almost any act of possession by a clamant
sufficient to support adverse possession. This approach appeared in Georgco
Diversified v. Lakeburn Land Capital Corp,'62 as well as in Ontario (Minister of
Natural Resources) v. Holdcrof,'63 a case against the Crown that involved the
settlement of a small island over a century ago.
It bears emphasis that, in many cases involving apathetic titleholders such
as Masidon,'" the court eschews the imputation of an intended use and simply
rejects the adverse possession claim. No coherent framework has arisen to ex-
plain when an imputation is justifiable and when it is not.
C. DISCONTENT WITH THE IUT
It took three decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal in relatively close prox-
imity (Keefer in 1977, Fletcher in 1981, and Masidon in 1984)165 to firmly en-
trench the IUT as part of the law of adverse possession in Ontario. However,
the various problems and ambiguities with the doctrine quickly engendered rum-
159. Ibid. at paras. 19-20.
160. MacKinnon, supra note 97 at para. 12.
161. (2004), 222 N.S.R. (2d) 229 at para. 103 (S.C.) [Duggan].
162. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
163. (2004), 19 RP.R. (4th) 70 at paras. 57-58 (Sup. Ct.), affd (2004), 27 R.P.R. (4th) 257 (CA.).
164. Masidon, supra note 1.
165. Keier, supra note 1; Fletcher, supra note 1; and Masidon, ibid.
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blings of discontent, as judges decried the "preposterous, 166 and "ludicrous" 167
exercise of requiring meritorious claimants to frustrate non-existent intentions.
In the 1996 Jeffbrett Enterprises Ltd. v. Marsh Bros. Tractors Inc. decision, Justice
Crane lamented the "significant degree of unnecessary confusion" that had arisen
in adverse possession cases.168 Pointing out that the law of adverse possession
does not distinguish between mutual mistakes and intentional squatters,1 69 he
reformulated the IUT as a rule of evidence rather than a test, suggesting that
failure to frustrate the titleholder's plans for the land only evidenced an under-
lying intent "to stay until removed by the true owner. " "'
In Teis, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the IUT was not living
up to initial expectations when Justice Laskin acknowledged that the test had
become "a controversial element" of adverse possession, which, taken to its
extreme, completely abnegated the institution.' The first sign of open revolt
against the IUT appeared in Bradford Investments,'72 where Justice Cullity deliv-
ered a searing critique of the theory, pointing out that it had become "thoroughly
discredited" in the United Kingdom and undermined adverse possession's fun-
damental purpose of protecting settled expectations.'73 He also derided the
premise-which underlay Masidon and other developer cases-that holding
land for development constituted a "use."' 7  Although Justice Cullity did not
fccl himsclf entitled to follow the House of Lords and declare the JUT dcad, he
expressly declined to apply Masidon and created a new exception. 5
The IUT recently came up again before the Court of Appeal in Elliott v.
Woodstock Agricultural Society, which featured a neighbour intentionally en-
croaching upon land owned by a developer in a deliberate attempt to appropriate
it through adverse possession. 76 The neighbour fenced the land, cleaned up
166. Galati, supra note 93 at para. 11.
167. Georgco Diversfied, supra note 95 at para. 17.
168. Jeffbrett, supra note 117 at para. 44.
169. Ibid. at paras. 46-47.
170. Ibid. at para. 54.
171. Teis, supra note 55 at para. 24.
172. Bradford Investments, supra note 95.
173. Ibid. at paras. 79, 100.
174. Ibid. at para. 99.
175. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
176. Elliott, supra note 145 at paras. 2-4.
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trees, and installed sprinklers.' The Court of Appeal nevertheless cursorily
denied the adverse possession claim on the grounds that the use of the land did
not frustrate the titleholder's plans to hold the land for development."l 8 Although
Elliott did not add anything new to the law of adverse possession, it did contain
a subtle hint that the Court would be willing to reconsider the IUT should a
suitable case arise.
179
There seems little doubt that the IUT in Ontario has reached a point of cri-
sis.18 If the doctrine does not die a natural death once the province completely
implements the Torrens system, the Court of Appeal may well review the doc-
trine when an appropriate case appears on its docket. The rise and fall of the IUT
in the course of a single generation, however, begs the question of how it man-
aged to catch on in the first place. Ontario's adverse possession law was appar-
ently missing something important that the IUT seemed to address, and a closer
inspection suggests that the "something" was the civil law principle of interversion.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
A comprehensive review of the cases that either apply or discuss the IUT-"the
IUT jurisprudence"-suggests the IUT represents an unconscious attempt by
the Ontario courts to develop a functional equivalent to interversion, the com-
mon law version of which had been abolished by statute in 1833.
A. CASE SELECTION
As shown in the Appendix, tables A (for Ontario) and B (for the rest of Canada)
list all of the reported Canadian jurisprudence on the IUT. Table A starts with
Keefer181 and continues to the November 2008 Court of Appeal decision in
177. Ibid.
178. Ibid. at paras. 21-28.
179. Ibid. at para. 30.
180. It bears note that not all discussion of the IUT has proven negative. One recent decision
defended the doctrine, opining that:
Indeed, it would be strange if an encroachment on vacant land that has no adverse impact on
the use of the true owner and is not inconsistent with the intended uses of the true owner either
now or in the future could amount to the kind of possession that would enable a successful
claim for adverse possession.
See Tasker, supra note 138 at para. 124.
181. Keefer, supra note 1.
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Tucker. 1 2 The compilation process began with database searches for jurispru-
dence containing the expressions "adverse possession" and "inconsistent use,"
which created a preliminary list of about two dozen cases. Noting up the cases
expanded the list considerably. Several additional searches conducted in French
attempted to locate cases from the francophone regions of Ontario or New
Brunswick that had not otherwise been included.
The final list of IUT jurisprudence contains eighty-two cases, including
seventy-three from Ontario, four from Prince Edward Island, two from New
Brunswick, one from Newfoundland, one from Nova Scotia, and one from
Alberta. The list excludes, however, cases that allude to the existence of the test,
but neither apply nor comment on it.
18 3
B. FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES
Tables A and B review all of the IUT cases and speculate on the treatment they
would have received in Quebec under article 923 of the CCQ. The tables con-
sider whether (a) the original claimant took physical possession of the land in
question "on behalf of another or with acknowledgement of a superior do-
main"; and, if yes, (b) whether the claimant demonstrated interversion through
"unequivocal facts." It then lists whether the trial judge applied some form of
the IUT or else found some reason to dispense with it.
Several hypotheses help to determine whether the IUT actually represented an
unconscious effort by the common law judiciary to deal with interversion issues:
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of adverse possession cases that apply the
IUT should approximate the proportion of acquisitive prescription cases that
make use of article 923 of the CCQ This hypothesis reflects that interversion is
only necessary to resolve a relatively small fraction of total acquisitive prescrip-
tion cases. If the IUT has a similar vocation, it should prove decisive with ap-
proximately the same frequency.
Hypothesis 2: Cases where the courts apply the IUT (as opposed to making
a categorical exemption) should correspond to cases where the claimant took
initial factual possession with "acknowledgement of a superior domain." This
hypothesis reflects the assumption that the IUT aims to deal with interversion
scenarios, not non-interversion scenarios. Cases where the courts have made
182. Tucker, supra note 137.
183. See e.g. Duggan, supra note 161.
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principled exceptions to the IUT should correspond to cases that have not
raised interversion issues.
Hypothesis 3: In cases where a claimant took possession "with acknowl-
edgement of a superior domain," and where courts apply the IUT and find for
the claimant, the claimant should have demonstrated interversion through un-
equivocal facts. This hypothesis aims to show that the IUT, when applied to the
appropriate kind of case, produces more or less the same results as the interver-
sion doctrine.
If Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are all true, they provide strong evidence that the
IUT serves as a common law proxy for article 923 of the CCQ, even though
they ostensibly deal with very different things.
The classification of the various cases has required several methodological
assumptions:
Acknowledgement of a superior domain: Under civil law, most people who
use land "with acknowledgement of a superior domain" fall into three catego-
ries: (a) titularies of a real right less than ownership, such as usufruct or servi-
tude, (b) those aware of the owner's rights and acting with permission, and (c)
undivided co-owners. In common law terminology, these three categories corre-
spond roughly to (a) a grantee, (b) a licensee, and (c) a co-tenant. "
Interversion through unequivocal facts: Because interversion constitutes a ques-
tion of fact that the common law judges do not assess, some cases do not lend
themselves to ready classification. Whether interversion took place in the civil
law sense remained particularly unclear in Elliott, where the claimants enclosed the
land with a locked gate,18 and Marotta, where the claimant's lawyer advised the
titleholder of her adverse possession claim.186 This study will assume that in-
terversion occurred in the latter case, but not the former, since the courts in
Quebec have generally proven sceptical of "factual" interversion, such as ceasing
rent payments, and have been more amenable to "juridical" interversion, such
as a notarized declaration.
187
184. A few other possibilities appear in the jurisprudence. For a vendor who retains physical
custody of the land, see Skidmore v. Parkin (2002), 5 R.P.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. Sup. Ct). For
superficiaries, see John Austin & Sons v. Smith (1982), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 59 (C.A.).
185. Elliott, supra note 145 at para. 10.
186. See Marotta, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
187. Lafond, supra note 14, s. 2.2.2.2(B) infine.
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Application of the IUT: In many of the IUT cases, judges offer a number of
possible justifications for their decisions. This article will generally consider the
IUT "applied" whenever a judge finds that the claimant frustrated an intended
use of the titleholder. However, when the judge makes it clear that the IUT is
not necessary to resolve the case, and he or she is using it purely on an alterna-
tive or hypothetical basis, the case will be classified as not applying the test.
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
1. HYPOTHESIS 1
A brief analysis suffices to assess Hypothesis 1. According to data collected from
Quicklaw and Westlaw/eCarswell and cross-referenced with.the IUT cases, 13
percent and 16 percent of all Ontario and Prince Edward Island adverse posses-
sion cases, respectively, apply the IUT."8' In Quebec, data from DCL/REJB and
Azimut, covering similar time periods, show that about 9 percent of cases involv-
ing acquisitive prescription invoke article 923 of the CCQ, or article 2008 of
the Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC). Table C summarizes the data and the
methodology of its collection.
The higher figures from the common law provinces make sense, given the
Ontario Court of Appeal's early insistence that rhe IUT constitutes an integral
aspect of all adverse possession claims.'89 The perceived importance of the IUT
motivated many common law judges to discuss and apply it where not strictly
necessary to resolve the dispute. 9 ' In contrast, the civil law acquisitive prescrip-
tion framework affords interversion only a peripheral role; it comes up when nec-
essary, and is generally ignored otherwise.
Looking at Table C, it seems that IUT cases in Ontario and Prince Edward
Island and interversion cases in Quebec both make up roughly a tenth of the total
AP caseload. Further research may assess the statistical significance of this value,
but it seems to be prima facie evidence that the IUT and interversion aim to re-
solve the same kinds of cases.
188. Hypothesis 1 was only tested in Ontario and Prince Edward Island since they are the only
provinces where the IUT has been consistently used for a significant period of time. See
discussion above.
189. See e.g. Keefer, supra note 1 at 691 ("Acts relied on as dispossessing the true owner must be
inconsistent with the form of enjoyment of the property intended by the true owner. This
has been held to be test for adverse possession since the leading case of Leigh v. Jack").
190. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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TABLE C: PREVALENCE OF INTERVERSION & IUT CASES (1990-PRESENT)
Cases with phrase Cases discussing Cases applying
Province adverse possession" IUT ing Percentage
(QL & eC average) _ _ _ _ 
_ _
Ontario 283.5 54 35 12%
P.E.I. 25 4 4 16%
Cases with phrase Cases citing Art. 923 CCQ
"acquisitive prescription" or Art. 2208 CCLC
Province (DCL/REJB & SOQUIJ (DCL/REJB & SOQUIJ Percentage
Summaries Average) Summaries Average)
Quebec 174.5 15.5 9%
2. HYPOTHESIS 2
Hypothesis 2 was confirmed by 80 per cent of the JUT jurisprudence. Where
the claimant originally took physical possession "with acknowledgement of a su-
perior domain," judges typically invoked the JUT to resolve the case; in cases
where the claimant took possession without acknowledgement of a superior
domain, judges typically created exceptions to the test.
Most of the sixteen cases that failed to confirm Hypothesis 2 applied the
JUT unnecessarily. Five (possibly six) cases involved claims where the court
invoked the JUT, even though the claimant's acts of possession could not pos-
sibly have grounded an adverse possession claim under traditional'principles.
91
Four other cases involved mutual mistake scenarios where the judge applied the
IUT with an imputed intention instead of waiving the test entirely.' 92
Two exceptional cases involved registration errors that occurred during the
termination of a co-tenancy, leaving a former co-owner on title accidentally. 93
191. Leichner v. Windy Briars Holdings Ltd. (1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 700 (C.A.); MacKinnon, supra
note 97; Henderson v. Wilson, [1989] O.J. No. 35 (Dist. Ct.) (QL); Brodie, supra note 127;
and Penwest, supra note 94. A sixth case also probably enters this category. See DiGenova,
supra note 128.
192. See Palis, supra note 110; Hoffele, supra note 112; Murdoch, supra note 111; and Guild v.
Mallory (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 21 (Sup. Ct.).
193. See Downerv. Karatnyk (2001), 18 R.F.L. (5th) 264 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Downer] (which involved
a matrimonial home, following a divorce, in which the ex-wife's name remained on the title
even though their divorce agreement gave sole tide to her former husband). See also Key v.
Latsky (2006), 39 R.P.R. (4th) 160 (Ont. C.A.) [Key] (which involved two men who
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In both cases, decades later, the party in physical possession sought to extinguish
the rights of the other through adverse possession. Under civil law, both cases fall
under the interversion rule insofar as the claimant originally held the disputed
land in conjunction with the titleholder, and thus recognized a superior domain;
however, the termination of co-ownership constituted an act of interversion that
started the clock running on acquisitive prescription. Hypothesis 2 suggests that
such cases should be resolved using the IUT. Yet, in both cases, the court applied
Beaudoin and the other mutual mistake cases and dispensed with the test en-
tirely."'h Nevertheless, although the two cases do not align with Hypothesis 2,
they still confirm the broader thesis that IUT attempts to articulate a functional
equivalent to article 923 of the CCQ. Since the IUT usually operates against
claimants, it stands to reason that cases in which interversion operates to benefit
claimants might manifest themselves as exceptions to the IUT.
Of the remaining exceptional cases, one involved an unclear factual situation
that may not have been properly classified, 9 ' and three that were potentially eli-
gible for the IUT were resolved based on relatively exotic and unrelated aspects of
adverse possession law.196
3. HYPOTHESIS3
In 98 per cent of all identified cases where the claimant took possession "in
acknowledgment of a superior domain," success depended on whether interver-
sion took place in the civil law sense. With interversion, the claim succeeded;
without interversion, it did not.
The only exception to Hypothesis 3 appears in Marotta v. Creative Invest-
ments Ltd.,9 ' a recent decision that reviewed a wide range of IUT jurisprudence.
Marotta involved a claim to a small, vacant lot that was left over from the devel-
opment of the area. A neighbour made extensive use of the lot for years, although
purchased a tract of land and divided it in two, but a metes and bounds error left a serious
divergence between the defacto and the dejure boundary).
194. Downer, ibid. at para. 22; Key, ibid. at para. 18.
195. Peters v. Palmer (2000), 34 R.P.R. (3d) 143 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
196. See Giouroukos, supra note 59 (deciding primarily on whether adverse possession can run
against land that is subject to a lease to a third-party); Moran v. Pappas (1997), 34 O.R. (3d)
251 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (dealing with whether the adverse possession period must start anew
following transfer of the land from the Crown to a private party); and Arnprior, supra note
136 (dealing primarily with certain provisions of railway legislation).
197. Marotta, supra note 95.
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she knew that she was not the owner." 8 She twice had her lawyer advise the title-
holder of her intention to assert title through adverse possession.199 The title-
holder knew that the claimant was on the lot, but raised no objections for over
twenty years following the initial letter from her lawyer."' When the adverse
possession claim reached the court, however, Justice Tulloch rejected it on the
grounds that Marotta's decades of land use did not frustrate the developer's plan
to hold the plot in inventory." 1
The correctness of Justice Tulloch's decision remains debatable. The title-
holder's refusal to even answer the claimant's letters, and its conscious acceptance
of her using the land as her backyard for over twenty years, would seem to con-
stitute the lack of owner vigilance often invoked in support of the AP institution.
In the civil law, Marotta's claim would likely have had a good chance of success,
since the letters sent from her solicitor could constitute "juridical acts" of interver-
sion. On the other hand, interversion is a question of fact, and even a Quebec
judge could, conceivably, have found the letters insufficient in the absence of
stronger measures, such as attempts to change the tax rolls, register a claim, or
fence in the property." 2 In that light, Marotra possibly does not really constitute
an exception to Hypothesis 3.
D. COUNTER-ARGUMENT: THE IUT AS "BAD FAITH"
Although this article argues that the IUT constitutes an unconscious attempt
of the judiciary to create a functional equivalent to article 923 of the CCQ,
it is also possible to construe the IUT as a move towards the judicial abolition
of bad faith adverse possession, a development already seen in the American
states of Washington and Iowa.2"3 England's common law courts undertook simi-
lar initiatives on multiple occasions, but found themselves overruled by West-
204iminster.
198. Ibid. at paras. 14-18.
199. Ibid. at paras. 19-20.
200. See generally ibid.
201. Ibid. at para. 91.
202. Justice Tulloch distinguished Marotta's claim from the trial judgment in Elliott, supra note
145, precisely on the grounds that Marotta never paid the relevant taxes on the land. See
Marotta, supra note 95 at para. 97.
203. See supra note 58.
204. See discussion'at Part II(B), above. See also supra notes 101, 102, and accompanying text.
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This article does not attempt to test the counter-hypothesis empirically, since
most IUT cases lack the findings of fact that are necessary to evaluate the good
or bad faith of the claimants. While most decisions note whether the claimant
believed he or she had title to the disputed land, very few contain findings on
the objective reasonableness of the belief, which constitutes another essential
element of good faith. In the absence of sufficient data, however, it suffices to
observe that, since interversion explains the outcome of virtually all of the IUT
cases, it seems unlikely that "good faith" can offer any greater explanatory power.
Also, the complete abolition of bad faith adverse possession would run
counter to the objectives of AP, which no doubt explains why so few American
states have endorsed the idea, and why Westminster intervened twice to curtail
it in England. AP aims to protect settled expectations, including those of third
parties, and to motivate titleholders to maintain some basic vigilance over the
use of their land. To achieve these objectives, bad-faith possessors have always
been able to acquire land through AP, even when it appears to reward wrongful
conduct. Although no examples appear amid the IUT jurisprudence, one Ameri-
can study has observed that successful bad-faith adverse possession cases typically
feature vulnerable or disadvantaged claimants, anonymous or mean-spirited
titleholders (such as abusive spouses), very prolonged periods of possession, and
expense.2"5 The abolition of bad faith adverse possession would frustrate these
meritorious claims.
Interversion offers a theoretically and empirically more satisfying model for
the results of the IUT cases than good faith. It accounts for the outcome of vir-
tually all the IUT jurisprudence, while reinforcing the basic adverse possession
principle that a claimant must notify the titleholder of any potential claim.
Recognizing that a grantee, licensee, or conscious intruder remains a grantee, li-
censee, or conscious intruder in the absence of clear contradictory acts reinforces
the settled expectations of the parties, rather than undermining them. At the same
time, interversion keeps the door open to bad-faith possession in extreme cases of
titleholder apathy, thereby allowing for the vesting of land title in those who are
ready to actually use it, rather than those who sit idly by while it is plundered.2"6
205. Helmholz, supra note 43 at 347-49 (listing a number of examples).
206. Note, however, that because of the development of modern technology (which has made
it easier to definitively record and determine who owns a piece of land) and the introduction
of the Torrens system, it is possible that the land registry better reflects "settled expectations"
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E. EMPIRICAL STUDY CONCLUSIONS
The empirical study demonstrates that the Ontario courts have misarticulated
the rule of law that appears to have subconsciously guided their decision-making.
The courts posited the IUT to deal with adverse possession claims that the civil
law jurist immediately recognizes as interversion cases. Since the common law
has no notion of interversion, the courts have had to develop alternative legal
theories to resolve these kinds of cases to their satisfaction. The IUT, coupled
with its various exceptions, serves as a fairly reliable proxy for article 923 of the
CCQ. However, all proxy indicators have their limits, which past cases have
revealed and future cases will no doubt continue to expose.
A defender of common law methodology could blame the legislature for the
confusion and point to the Real Property Reform Act, 1833, which abolished ouster
and, thus, seemed to close the door on interversion. 207 The fact that American
courts have carved out interversion-like rules for specific situations, such as co-
tenancies and grantors remaining in possession, suggests that the Canadian courts
may have followed suit in the absence of legislative intervention.0 8 On the other
hand, the courts often find ways of mitigating the impact of statutory provisions,
particularly ones dating from the distant past, that today prove unduly broad
and inflexible. The Ontario courts could, no doubt, have found a way to carve
out a space for some sort of interversion doctrine had they realized its utility.
Rather than pointing fingers, however, it is more useful to consider why the
common law remained settled on the proxy test for interversion, even when
its problems started to become apparent. As Part V demonstrates, the use of
increasingly-complicated proxy theories constitutes a foreseeable and practically
inevitable consequence of the common law's inductive methodology.
V. REFLECTIONS ON INDUCTIVE LAW-MAKING
A. NOTION OF INDUCTIVE LAW MAKING
In civil law, legislative instruments establish laws which judges apply to the vari-
ous cases before them. The civil legal system presumes the completeness of
of land ownership than the facts that exist on the ground. In this light, the abolition of bad faith
adverse possession could help reinforce settled expectations rather than undermine them.
207. See the discussion in Part If(B), above.
208. Helmholz, supra note 43 at 351-56.
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legislation and mandates judges to derive from the enacted law the precise rule
that resolves the case at hand.2 9 A judge's deductions in a particular case do not
constitute a primary source of law and do not bind subsequent tribunals. Civil
law jurisdictions generally standardize application of the law, not through stare
decisis, but through cassation, which quashes aberrant decisions and sends them
back to another court for rehearing.
210
Common law judges, in contrast, settle disputes based not only on laws pro-
mulgated by the legislature, but also on their personal assessments of situations, as
guided by the collective experience of the judiciary. Common law judges "make
law" insofar as they formulate new rules, or revise old ones, as novel situations
arise. At the same time, however, the common law places a large premium upon
predictability and consistency, and therefore it adheres to the principle that the
ratio decidendi-the underlying legal rule that ties the relevant facts to the out-
come-of a court decision binds the court when faced with essentially similar
scenarios. 21  The common law balances predictability and flexibility by constru-
ing rationes decidendi as narrowly as possible and relegating the rest of a judge's
commentary to non-binding obiter dicta.21 2 As jurisprudence accumulates on a
particular subject, jurists survey the various rationes decidendi and articulate
broader principles of law.213 Common law law-making is therefore inductive, as
it works from individual judgements to general principles.
The inductive nature of common law law-making resembles how scientists
infer laws of nature based from the observation of discrete natural phenomena.
209. This is true notwithstanding the residual role of "custom" as a source of law. See John E.C.
Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald, Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec Private
Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 118-21; Louis Baudouin, Les aspects giniraux
du droitprivi dans la Province du Quibec (Paris: Dalloz, 1967) at 55-60.
210. See generally Alain Lacabarats, "The State of Case Law in France" (2005) 51 Loy. L. Rev.
79; Sofie M. F. Geeroms, "Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms
Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be Translated..." (2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L.
201 at 203.
211. For a review of the history of stare decisis and a summary of its application in Canada, see
Debra Parkes, "Precedent Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada"
(2007) 32 Man. L.J. 135.
212. For discussion of the nature of rationes decidendi and obiter dicta, see Ian McLeod, Legal
Method(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) at 121-47.
213. A particularly storied example of this practice can be found in Donaghue v. Stevenson, (19321
A.C. 562 (H.L.). In this seminal case, Lord Atkin proposed a generalized duty of care from
the list of duty relationships previously recognized by the jurisprudence.
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As explained by epistemologist Karl Popper,2 the articulation of a law of nature
necessarily starts with a problem, such as an unanswered question or an unex-
plained observation. Scientists then start proposing testable solutions to the prob-
lem; an untestable theory-such as that the various celestial bodies are pushed
around by angels-cannot provide a basis for inquiry.2' 5 The proposed model
then faces testing and critique. If the postulated model has equal or superior
explanatory power than what came before, it is deemed a superior model and
adopted. The process repeats when a new problem arises.
In the common law law-making process, the Popperian framework translates
as follows: the articulation of a new legal principle starts with a "problem," mean-
ing a suit that the judge believes should be decided a certain way, but which lacks
(or is contrary to) a clear precedent. The judge then proposes a rule, which may
either be an entirely novel legal principle, or a modification or qualification of
an earlier one. The rule is "testable" if articulated sufficiently clearly and objec-
tively that judges can apply it in future cases. If the rule resolves future cases to
the satisfaction of the judges involved, the rule is proven "true." Otherwise, a new
problem arises.
This model of inductive law-making relies on several simplifying assump-
tions. Most notably, "the law" is seen as something that common law judges
ultimately describe rather than "make." In the real world, of course, the law is
not exogenous from judges in the same way that the laws of science are exoge-
nous from scientists. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the
common law judiciary has a strong,- shared sense of how disputes should be
decided, with appellate courts reining in judges who deviate excessively from
the institutional norm. Consequently, the ultimate role of judges is not so much
to "make" the law, but ro articulate clear principles that allow lay-people to
predict how cases will be decided.
B. INDUCTIVE LAW MAKING REVEALED IN THE IUT JURISPRUDENCE
The workings of inductive law-making reveal themselves in the IUT jurispru-
dence on two distinct levels: the initial adoption of the IUT in the seminal cases
214. See generally David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1997) at 55-72.
Note, however, that Popper himself rejected "inductive" reasoning, although he was using
the term in a different sense than it is used here (at 56-62).
215. Ibid. at 63.
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of Keefer, Fletcher, and Masidon,21' and the subsequent controversy surrounding
the test for three decades afterwards.
1. THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE IUT
The JUT has its origins in the "problem" faced by the Court of Appeal in Keefer,
Fletcher, and Masidon. The Court apparently believed that, without some sub-
stantive change in adverse possession law, as articulated at the time, the claimants
in all three cases would have succeeded, thereby producing results that the Court
felt unjust." To deal with this challenge, the Court of Appeal postulated the
IUT-the novel principle that, for adverse possession to occur, a claimant must
somehow frustrate the titleholder's individual plans with regard to the land.
To merit adoption, a new postulate must be testable and have greater predic-
tive power than what came before it. The JUT ultimately met the first require-
ment, but not the second. The JUT is testable insofar as it allows for unambi-
guous conclusions following certain findings of fact. If a finder of fact determines
that a claimant did not frustrate an intended use of the titleholder, then the
claimant fails the JUT; if a meritorious adverse possessor fails the IUT (as seen
soon afterwards in the mutual mistake cases), then the JUT is proven "false."
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal adopted the JUT without subjecting it
to any meaningful assessment of its predictive power. Given that mutual mis-
take scenarios make up a large proportion of adverse possession cases, it seems
almost surprising that the Court of Appeal did not review a single such case
when it derived the JUT from Leigh v. Jack.218 Had the Court of Appeal "tested"
the JUT by attempting to apply it to other archetypical adverse possession cases,
it probably would have realized right away that it had very little explanatory
power and, thus, did not merit adoption.
2. JURISPRUDENCE FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF THE IUT
The task of testing and critiquing the JUT thus fell to subsequent tribunals,
which soon faced the new problem of a large number of meritorious adverse
possession claimants who failed the JUT. Consequently, the various lower courts
began to postulate new solutions, including no less than four exceptions to the
216. Keefer, supra note 1; Fletcher, supra note 1; and Masidon, supra note 1.
217. The Court may have felt the need to modify the law since, in theory, it generally does not have
the power to review questions of fact. See Justice MacKinnon's dissent in Keefer, ibid. at 681.
218. Leigh, supra note 74.
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doctrine (i.e., mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, colour of right, and defacto
renunciation) and six varieties of imputed intentions (i.e., hypothetical, potesta-
tive, objective, teleological, future use, and evacuative). The cases feature a fan-
tastic diversity of approaches that, read as a whole, represent a highly creative
brainstorming exercise among the judiciary.
However, these widely varying postulates have also experienced an unfor-
tunate dearth of testing and critique. Although judges prove very adept at ar-
ticulating principles that resolve cases before them to their satisfaction, they
generally do not endeavour to review whether the principles adequately deal
with a wide variety of comparable cases that have appeared in the past or may
arrive in the future. As seen in Tables A and B, most of the IUT cases, particu-
larly those of the Ontario Court of Appeal, cite, at most, three or four previous
IUT cases-a small fraction of the total number available.
On the other hand, the jurisprudence reveals a significant change in ap-
proach since 2005, with a number of recent cases surveying a broader spectrum
of prior jurisprudence, notably Bradford Investments (7 references),219 Mueller v.
Lee (8 references),220 Laurier Homes (8 references),221 Goode v. Hudon (12 refer-
ences),222 and Marotta (15 references).223 The sudden proliferation of jurispru-
dence that more extensively reviews what has come before suggests that the IJUT
jurisprudence may be moving from a postulating to a true testing phase. The
Court of Appeal's recent hint that it may b6 willing to review the doctrine with
a bench of five judges may confirm the arrival of a more critical mindset.2"
If, in fact, the jurisprudence has moved into a more critical phase, then the
Ontario judiciary may collectively realize that the IUT, even with something
approximating a good faith exception, has limited explanatory power and should
be replaced. It may replace the IUT with an interversion rule, particularly if pro-
posed by the counsel appearing at the time. However, such an outcome remains
unlikely, since various structural features of the common law judiciary tend to
reinforce the retention of old models of legal reasoning, even when novel frame-
works can offer much clearer guidance to lower tribunals and the general public.
219. Bradford Investments, supra note 95.
220. Mueller v. Lee (2007), 59 R.P.R. (4th) 199 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
221. Laurier Homes, supra note 95.
222. Goode v. Hudon (2005), 30 R.P.R. (4th) 202 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
223. Marotta, supra note 95.
224. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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B. COGNITIVE BIASES IN INDUCTIVE LAW MAKING
The failure of the Ontario courts to articulate an interversion principle, and
instead extrapolate the IUT with a good faith exception from its interversion-
like cases, reveals how inductive reasoning does not always work optimally within
a law-making context. A number of cognitive biases manifest themselves that
reduce the ability of the courts to articulate concise legal principles with strong
explanatory power. Such biases foster the development of complex proxy theories
that become increasingly muddled as jurisprudence accumulates.22 This article
has offered the IUT as a case study for this phenomenon, although other com-
mon law doctrines, such as valuable consideration and" the duty of care, may
offer other examples.
First, the IUT jurisprudence evidences a strong confirmation bias within
common law decision-making. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency to
select evidence that supports a theory and to ignore evidence that contradicts'
it.226 It creates inaccuracy in model testing and can lead to the adoption of infe-
rior theories. The Court of Appeal exemplified such confirmation bias when it
originally adopted the IUT without any consideration of the mutual mistake
adverse possession cases, which would have immediately exposed the inadequacy
of the theory.
Although confirmation bias occurs naturally in human decision-making,
structural factors in the court system magnify its influence. Under the adversar-
ial system characteristic of the common law, responsibility for bringing relevant
jurisprudence to the court's attention lies with the parties-and the parties, seek-
ing to limit research costs and to present their own arguments in the most posi-
tive light, limit themselves to precedents that best support their particular claims.
The problem of how the adversarial system can unduly limit the flow of infor-
mation to the court came out explicitly in Murdoch, where one party was un-
represented by counsel, and Justice Heeney lamented the incompleteness of the
authorities presented during the hearing:
225. For a general introduction to how cognitive biases operate in legal contexts, see Stephen J.
Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, "Behavioral Economics and the SEC" (2003) [unpublished,
archived at SSRN], online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=500203>.
226. See ibid. at n. 30 and accompanying text. See also Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean,
"Confirmation Bias" in Riidiger F. Pohl, ed., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and
Biases in Thinking (New York: Psychology Press, 2004) at 79.
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Counsel have an ethical duty to ensure that all of the relevant law, for and against
their case, is before the court. Where, as here, the opposite party is unrepresented, it
seems to me that that duty is all the more important, since an unrepresented party is
unlikely to have the expertise to research the applicable law and assemble the relevant
cases. There are many reported cases that deal with the significance of a fence in an
adverse possession claim. Unfortunately, those cases were not put before me by Mr.
Kratzmann, and in the interests of justice it was necessary for additional research to
be done by the court.
227
Confirmation bias also manifests itself through a tendency by judges, perhaps
as a form of professional courtesy, simply to ignore, rather than criticize, unpopu-
lar or eccentric theories put forth in other decisions. In the IUT jurisprudence,
this tendency appears most visibly in the mutual mistake cases that imputed
intent to the titleholder (Palis, Murdoch, Hoffele) rather than create an exemp-
tion to the IUT (as in Wood). As seen in Table A, Palis, Murdoch, and Hoffele
found themselves discussed in no subsequent jurisprudence, whilst Wood alone
appeared in over twenty.228
Judicial law-making also suffers from a strong anchoring bias, which over-
values that which has been said before. 29 It distorts decision-making by afford-
ing undue weight to earlier theories and reducing the incentive to formulate
completely new ones. Anchoring bias becomes particularly strong when dealing
with appellate court judgements, since the judiciary tends to believe and act as
if the abstract tests and frameworks proposed by the Court of Appeal form part
of the ratio decidendi and have binding authority.
However, this expansive understanding of the ratio decidendi is not strictly
true. In principle, the only truly binding element of a judicial decision is a
proposition that a certain set of facts will produce a certain conclusion. 2" The
theoretical link between the facts and the conclusion in a given case constitutes
speculation and modelling, not an imperative rule of law. In this light, the ratio
decidendi of Keefer becomes as follows: when a titleholder makes occasional use
of a strip of land subject to a right-of-way, the building of minor structures upon
227. Murdoch, supra note 111 at para. 40.
228. Palis, supra note 110; Murdoch, ibid.; Hoffele, supra note 112; and Wood, supra note 118.
229. For a general discussion of anchoring bias, see generally Thomas Mussweiler et aL,
"Anchoring Effect" in Pohl, supra note 226 at 183.
230. This understanding of the ratio decidendi is generally attributed to the American jurist
Herman Oliphant. See Arthur L. Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case"
(1930) 40 Yale L. Rev. 163 at 168.
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the right-of-way by the right-of-way holder without objection by the titleholder
cannot serve as a basis for adverse possession. 231 The ratio of Fletcher may read:
when a titleholder builds a fence within his own land, intentionally leaving a
strip between the fence and his neighbour's land, basic grounds-keeping on the
strip by the neighbours, who know that the strip does not form part of their
property, without objection by the titleholder, cannot serve as a basis for ad-
verse possession.232 Neither ratio says anything about interversion or inconsis-
tent use, and both interversion and inconsistent use offer a reasonable prima
facie explanation for why the facts gave rise to the ultimate result. The Court of
Appeal, seeking to provide guidance for lower courts, proposed the JUT as the
basis for the decisions reached. But nothing in principle forbids a future court,
even a trial court, from not following the Court of Appeal's suggested approach
and adopting a new one in its place.
Of course, this austere view of the ratio decidendi does not apply in practice.
Canada's appellate courts have adopted an expansive view of their role that in-
cludes the power to prescribe tests and analytical frameworks for lower courts to
follow when addressing similar cases. Although lower-level courts in Alberta and
Newfoundland felt themselves entitled to reject the JUT entirely, or downgrade
its importance,2 33 Ontario's judges have not felt themselves so privileged. As
justice Cullity lamented in Bradford Invesirnents, Ontario's lower courts have
felt themselves obligated to apply the JUT as directed by the Court of Appeal,
even when it would produce counter-intuitive results, or was not necessary to
resolve the disputes at hand.13 Only in one Ontario JUT case, Jeffbrett, did the
trial judge demonstrate a willingness to comprehensively reinterpret the earlier
cases (particularly Masidon) in a manner that effectively did away with the JUT
entirely.
2 31
Other structural factors further reinforce the anchoring bias in common law
law-making. The casuistic and incrementalist methodology of the common law,
according to which judges decide disputes by reviewing past cases and selecting
the most similar, strongly motivates judges to use the established frameworks as
their own starting points. Whether they "apply" or "distinguish" a precedent,
231. Keefer, supra note 1.
232. Fletcher, supra note 1.
233. See supra notes 101, 102, and accompanying text.
234. Bradford Investments, supra note 95 at para. 6.
235. Jeff rett, supra note 117 at para. 54.
LUBETSKY, ADDING EPICYCLES 51
they implicitly affirm the precedent's reasoning. Moreover, since the common
law expects judges to limit their decision-making to the case before them, they
only have incentive to comprehensively review and reinterpret past jurisprudence
when established doctrines have grown too cumbersome and unwieldy to apply.
By this point, however, a bandwagon effect comes into play; individual judges
may not feel themselves suitably quaiified or able to challenge a theory that has
featured in dozens (if not hundreds) of other cases-including cases issued or
approved by appellate courts. Under the common law, therefore, the prolifera-
tion of problematic cases that involve a questionable legal doctrine ironically
contributes to the doctrine's persistence.
The anchoring effect motivates judges to follow existing frameworks instead
of proposing new ones. While this conservatism may help to ensure the predict-
ability of the law, it undermines the effective operation of inductive reasoning.
A model does not have greater explanatory power simply because it was articu-
lated first. To the contrary, some of the most spectacular advances in human
knowledge involved the total replacement of established paradigms, such as when
Einstein replaced Newton's venerable laws of motion with special relativity in
1905. Unfortunately, such radical rewriting of principles causes all sorts of havoc
in law, insofar as practitioners and the citizenry at large rely on long-settled ex-
pectations of how the law operates. Existing theories, therefore, persist under the
common law tradition and they become increasingly elaborate and confusing as
time passes.
The attempts of early astronomers to model planetary motion exemplify the
effect of the same cognitive biases that are present in the common law. Early
astronomers subscribed to a principle that celestial objects could only move in
perfect circles. Since observed planetary movement did not accord with circular
motion, Hipparchus and Ptolemy theorized that planets moved in epicycles-
perfect circular orbits around reference points that themselves moved in perfect
circular orbits. As later astronomical observations in the Middle Ages proved
inconsistent with Ptolemaic theory, astronomers postulated increasing numbers
of epicycles-perfect circular orbits around reference points which orbited in
perfect circles around other reference points that orbited in perfect circles around
further reference points, et cetera. The endless iterations of epicycles proved
incredibly complex and lacked any intuitive basis. Only when Kepler shocked
the scientific world with the suggestion that celestial bodies moved in ellipses,
not circles, were epicycles finally replaced by a general theory of planetary mo-
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tion that led to the discovery of Neptune and a host of other astronomical ad-
vances.
Today, the expression "adding epicycles" has become a term of derision
for constantly tweaking a theory to make its predictions match the facts, even
when it has become clear that the basic premises of the theory are wrong.
Unfortunately, as seen in the IUT jurisprudence, the incrementalist law-making
practiced by the common law courts tends to promote the "addition of epicycles"
to questionable legal theories, rather than the seeking of better concepts.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to identify some of the limitations of inductive law-
making, using. one particular line of jurisprudence to illustrate how various
cognitive biases lead the common law judiciary to develop elaborate and con-
voluted approaches to relatively simple problems. It bears emphasis that this
article has not sought to disparage the common law (much less suggest that it is
inferior to the civil law, which arguably has the opposite problem of tending to
oversimplify complicated problems); rather, it has aimed to increase awareness
of the potential side effects of the common law's methodology and to encourage
jurists to become more sensitive to its effects.
The results of this article reveal the usefulness of discourse across legal sys-
t'ems. While this article does not advocate the uncritical adoption of civil law
principles in the common law, it does suggest that an openness to, and interest
in, alternative legal models can help the courts arrive at just decisions and co-
herent explanations. Had the Ontario Court of Appeal considered how civil law
courts would have assessed the claims in Keefer, Fletcher, and Masidon, it would
perhaps have articulated an explanatory model more convincing-and less prob-
lematic-than the IUT.
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APPENDIX: lUT JURISPRUDENCE SUMMARY TABLESt
TABLE A: ONTARIO IUT CASES (IN ORDER OF OCCURRENCE)
SUMMARY DATA
r
-" 1-.E 8 8 : '
Kee v. A illa
1 (1976), 13 O.R. Yes No No Yes True True >60 0
(2d) 680 (CA.)
Fletcher t, Storoschuk
2 (198), 35 O.R. Yes No No Yes True True >60 1
(2d) 722 (C.A.).
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1-/td.e v. Sithak
















Guild et al v.
5 Mallory (1983), 41 No N/A No yes. False N/A 0 2
O.P1 (2d) 21 (H.).
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Ltd. v. Ham (1984),
20O.A.C. 147




f" The data presented below is a summary of a more comprehensive research compilation,
available from the author onrequest.
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